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IV. 
COMES NOW, Appellant, Rubio Izat,ruirre, in Reply to the arguments made by 
Respondents in their brief filed in this matter on the 10111 day of July, 2012. 
JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Respondents make the argument that the Order of Industrial Commission appealed from 
herein is not a final Order and that the Appeal should therefore be dismissed. The Respondents 
cite to Hartman v. Double L Mamifacturing, 141 Idaho 456, 457, 111 P.3d 141, 142 (2005) and 
The Department a./Employment v. Hopper, 126 Idaho 144, 879 P.2d 1077 (1994). 
The problem with the Hartman case, cited by Respondents in support of its argument, is 
that the Hartman case is one in which the Industrial Commission "reserved jurisdiction" to make 
additional findings with regard to the topic it had decided. In that case, the employee Fritz 
Hartman brought a case against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. In its hearing, the 
Industrial Commission heard testimony and concluded that Mr. Hartman had suffered an injury 
at work on March 16, 1999, and that he was totally disabled. However, the Industrial 
Commission could not decide from the record the extent of the liability of the Defendant ISIF 
and therefore retained jurisdiction to allow the parties to present additional evidence to establish 
the extent of liability of the Defendant ISIF. 
When the ISIF appealed, the Court noted that because the Industrial Commission had 
retained jurisdiction over the extent to which the ISIF was liable to the Claimant, the Order was 
not final and appealable. 
This Court noted that when the Industrial Commission makes a decision about 
compensability but fails to make a decision about the extent to which a Claimant may or may not 
be entitled to benefits, and retains jurisdiction to make that decision, the retention of jurisdiction 
indicates that there is neither a final determination of the case nor a final permanent award to the 
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Claimant. In its decision, the Court cited to a number of cases all of which involved the retention 
of jurisdiction by the Industrial Commission to award benefits after initial determinations had 
been made regarding compensability. 
The Appellant would note that this line of authority does not apply to the instant appeal. 
The Industrial Commission herein made a final determination about the extent of the subrogation 
rights possessed by Respondent and set forth all of its findings with regard to the exact monetary 
extent of these subrogation rights. (See, R. pp. 114-116, ,-r,-r 60-64). As to these issues, the 
Industrial Commission certified that pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and 
conclusive as to all issues adjudicated. (See, R. p. 117). 
The Appellant contends that this Court has heard appeals many times over Industrial 
Commission cases where Industrial Commission rulings make full and final decisions as to some 
issues but left others for later hearing and decision. Bifurcation of issues before the Industrial 
Commission has long been recognized and does not prevent an appeal from the issues decided as 
long as the Industrial Commission makes all findings necessary with regard to the issues actually 
heard and adjudicated. 
For instance in VerDene Page v. McCain Foods, 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005), 
the Court noted that the Claimant's case had been dismissed by the Industrial Commission based 
upon findings that the Claimant had not given proper notice and that the Claimant had not 
suffered an accident under the Idaho Worker's Compensation law. The Industrial Commission 
had made full and final findings as to these two issues and thereafter the Claimant appealed. 
After discussing the evidence at length, this Court reversed and remanded to the 
Industrial Commission noting that the Industrial Commission had additional issues to address. 
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After additional findings of fact and conclusions of law were made by the Industrial 
Commission, the Claimant made a motion to present additional evidence and this was denied. 
Filing yet another appeal, Claimant Page claimed that she should have been awarded additional 
benefits and that the failure of the Industrial Commission to accept additional evidence was in 
error. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). The Court herein 
agreed with Page and found that the Industrial Commission had failed to act when presented with 
evidence of a manifest injustice and noted that additional evidence should have been received by 
the Industrial Commission prior to its decision. Again, the Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the Industrial Commission for the consideration of additional evidence, finding that further 
proceedings were necessary to fully and finally adjudicate the Claimant's contentions and 
claims. 
The above-cited case is only one of many cases wherein the Industrial Commission has 
bifurcated issues and appeals have been taken from the bifurcated decisions as long as the 
Industrial Commission decision contained full and final decisions and findings as to those issues 
actually adjudicated. 
Appellant contends that the Industrial Commission in this case made full and final 
decisions as to the issues actually adjudicated and the decision herein has all the findings 
necessary to classify those issues as fully decided. The Industrial Commission did not retain 
jurisdiction over the issues it had adjudicated but bifurcated the issues actually presented at the 
request of the parties. 
Because these issues are legally important and are sufficient in of and themselves and 
control much ofthe future rights ofthe parties, this appeal is appropriate and should proceed. 
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CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION 
Defendants contend that the settlement agreement achieved in this case between the 
Claimant and the third-party should be interpreted to require Appellant to reimburse the 
Respondents as they request as a separate and independent basis. The Respondents argue that 
they are a third-party beneficiaries on the contract and that the contract entitles them to the 
entirety of the settlement made by the Appellant. 
It should be remembered that this argument was not made at the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission was not asked to interpret this contract nor was it asked to determine 
the contractual obligation to the parties as it relates to the issue presented. 
Indeed, had the Industrial Commission been asked to interpret this contract, and make a 
decision about whether or not the contract itself required the result which Respondents request, 
the Industrial Commission would rightly have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this regard. 
Clearly, the Industrial Commission only has jurisdiction to consider questions arising under the 
Worker's Compensation laws ofthe State. See, Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 
260 P.3d 1186 (2011); Van Tine v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d 717 
(1994); Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.3d 455 (2005). 
Because the Respondents request for a purely contractual ruling on its request for relief 
herein is beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and because this issue was not 
raised below, the Court herein should not entertain it now. 
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF § 72-223(3) 
As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief, the starting point for the argument in this case 
comes from the language contained in Idaho Code § 72-223(3), the statute which creates a 
subrogation right in Respondents favor. 
Respondents have argued that the statute contains an express limit on their subrogation 
right. However, Respondents argue that the limit is not one which applies to the type ofbenefits 
from which they may obtain their subrogation rights, but only to the amount of their subrogation 
right. 
Curiously, the statute does not say this nor does it make any implication in this regard of 
any kind. Appellant would note that the statute contains a limitation on the Defendants 
subrogation right which limits the Defendants right of subrogation to the extent of the 
Defendant's obligation for compensation liability. 
As Appellant has argued previously, all the terms of this limitation are very carefully and 
completely defined in Title 72 of the Idaho Code. The term "compensation" is defined in all of 
its several meanings. These definitions define an obligation both as to type and as to amount. 
"Compensation" includes medical expenses which may be small and which may be large. 
"Compensation" includes time loss benefits which may be miniscule or may be substantial in 
nature. "Compensation" is defined as permanent impairment and permanent disability benefits. 
Again these range from almost nil to benefits which may last the lifetime of the Claimant. 
Nowhere within the definitions applicable to this term does any limitation as to type appear. 
Clearly, if the Legislature had intended a limited meaning when they use the words 
"compensation liability," the Appellant contends that this should have been spelled out 
completely. Because there is no language which limits the compensation liability term to 
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amount and not to type, Appellant contends that no such limitation should be implied or read into 
the statute by this Court. This limitation as to the term "compensation liability" should come 
from the Legislature, and not from this Court. 
Respondents attempt to bolster their argument by citing to Idaho Code § 72-223(2) which 
allows an employer or its surety to participate in or bring an action against the negligent third-
party. Respondents also argue the Idaho Code § 72-223( 4) supports their argument and means 
that there is no limitation on their right of subrogated recovery. 
Appellant would respond that neither Idaho Code§ 72-223(2) or Idaho Code§ 72-223(4) 
bestow the right of subrogation upon the Respondent. These subsections are part of the 
comprehensive framework which allows a surety to proceed as against a negligent third-party 
and which require the Respondent and like sureties to pay an attorney's fee from a third-party 
recovery obtained by an injured employee. However, they do not particularly assist this Court in 
deciding the issue at hand. Appellant therefore contends that reference to these statutes is not 
particularly helpful in deciding the issue presented. 
Appellant continues to contend that as a matter of statutory construction, the limitation 
language contained in Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limits the Respondents recovery both as to the 
type ofbenefits which it has paid and as to the amount of benefits which it has paid out. That is 
to say, the plain language of Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limits a surety from recovering against 
damages for which it did not insure. Any other interpretation of the statute either assumes more 
than the language implies or rewrites the statute in an impermissible manner. 
THE STRUHS CASE 
As expected, the Respondents have made quite an argument about the impact of the case 
of Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164 (1999). The Industrial 
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Commission ruled that because the Struhs court did not remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission for additional findings, this means, presumably, that the Supreme Court agreed that 
all of the recovery obtained by Struhs in his third-party case was subject to the lien of the 
worker's compensation surety. 
As the Appellant and Amicus Curia have argued, the Industrial Commission is thereby 
basing its holding in this case upon a presumption or an assumption about what the Court herein 
meant when it failed to remand the case to the Industrial Commission. Appellant contends that 
despite the vigorous argument of Respondents in this matter, a case of first of impression should 
not be based upon an assumption or a presumption about what this Court meant or did not mean 
in its decision to remand or not to remand the particular case at issue. 
It is clear that the Struhs court held, in a case of first impression, that a Claimant and a 
third-party cannot bind a workers' compensation surety without their participation. This is the 
only legal holding of the case that is pertinent herein. 
The parties herein do not dispute this ruling and, indeed, this is the reason that Appellant 
herein requested a hearing before the Industrial Commission and invited the participation of the 
Respondent. The parties were both afforded an opportunity to present evidence as to the proper 
allocation of the third-party settlement obtained by the Appellant and presented the Industrial 
Commission with sufficient evidence upon which to base such an allocation. This proceeding 
offered both parties full and fair opportunity to present evidence on this critical issue and the 
parties joined in requesting that the Industrial Commission make special factual findings 
allocating the settlement made by the Appellant into appropriate categories so that legal 
decisions could be made on the basis of those findings. 
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The Court in Struhs, supra, was never presented with any request for an allocation nor 
was the Industrial Commission below asked to allocate the settlement made by the Claimant as 
against the third-party. In that case, it was apparent that the Claimant had improperly attempted 
to make that allocation without the participation of the workers' compensation surety and this 
Court found that that was indeed improper and not binding on the workers' compensation surety. 
It seems clear that the issue of allocation was not presented to the Industrial Commission 
below and because the Supreme Court was not asked to engage in any such allocation, the 
decision of the Supreme Court not to remand was simply a matter of procedure, not precedent. 
Certainly, the Supreme Court is not bound to anticipate issues not raised by the parties in 
this manner and especially not issues of first impression which were neither argued, briefed or 
raised by either of the parties. For the Industrial Commission to base its decision upon such a 
situation is unsound, unwise and unwarranted. 
CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
As Appellant has argued in his Opening Brief, the statutory basis for the decision 
requested herein comes from the plain language of Idaho Code § 72-223(3), which the parties 
agree imposes a limitation on the subrogated right of worker's compensation sureties in this 
State. 
Appellant contends that the statutory framework for this argument imposes a limitation 
on the type and amount of benefits a workers' compensation surety can attach. Respondents 
admit that the statute granting them subrogated rights limits their right, but argues that the 
limitation only applies to the amount of benefits which they can attach. 
When examining cases from other states, it is apparent the many different kinds of 
statutory bases have been enacted and Appellant would note that many of the cases cited by 
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Respondents are based upon statutory frameworks substantially different than what we have here 
in the State of Idaho. 
For instance, Respondents cite to several federal cases such as United States v. Lorenzetti, 
467 U.S. 167, 104 S.Ct. 2284, 81 L.Ed.2d 134 (1984). That case concerned a federal 
government employee injured in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania while on official 
business. The Supreme Court found that the statute granting subrogation rights to the federal 
government was not limited in any way and entitled the federal government to obtain recovery 
from the injured employee regardless of the characterization of the settlement obtained by the 
employee. It should be noted that the government was not a party to the settlement or suit and 
did not participate in the characterization of the settlement obtained by the employee. The 
Supreme Court specifically noted that the language which granted the federal government 
subrogation rights did not distinguish between benefits which were paid out under the federal 
workers' compensation program and those which were not and that the federal government had 
unlimited rights of recovery. 
Lorenzetti does not provide any assistance to the Court herein. The statute granting 
subrogation rights to workers' compensation sureties in Idaho is limited and Respondents have 
admitted to this limitation. The limiting language found in Idaho Code §72-223(3) distinguishes 
this case from the federal cases based upon the federal statute interpreted by the court in 
Lorenzetti, supra, and the case therefore presents little help to the Court herein. 
Likewise, the statute interpreted in the case of Force v. Dir., Office of Workers' Camp. 
Programs, 938 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1991) is likewise unlimited and did not restrict the office of 
workers' compensation programs in its attempt to subrogate against an employee's third-party 
recovery. In Force, supra, it appeared that the decedent George Force had been exposed to 
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asbestos while employed at Keiser Aluminum in the 1940's. Prior to his death in 1984 from 
asbestos related disease, he filed a claim against Keiser under the Longshoreman and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act for death benefits, medical expenses and disability benefits that had 
accrued to her husband before he passed away. Mr. and Mrs. Force also sued various third-party 
asbestos manufacturers as a result of the exposure and asbestos-related death. 
Before the Longshoreman and Harbor workers' compensation case went to trial, Mrs. 
Force settled her third-party case without the participation of the Longshore and Harbor 
representatives. Upon request, the ALI presiding over the Longshore and Harbor Worker's case 
allowed a credit against the liability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Act in the 
amount of the entire settlement because the settlement agreements had not allocated or divided 
up the settlement into specific categories of damages. The ALJ rejected the allocation suggested 
by the Claimants finding that any such allocation made subsequent to the settlement would be 
based on pure speculation. 
Upon review, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the statute granting subrogation 
rights to the Longshore and Harbor Worker's director was unlimited and did not require any 
allocation ofbenefits. Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 933(f), the Court noted that the offset applied to 
the net amount recovered against the third-party without limitations except for litigation 
expenses and attorney's fees. 
Again, Appellant would note that the crucial factor in Force is the statute which grants 
subrogation rights. The Court found that this statute was unlimited in nature and had no 
language which required an allocation of benefits or allowed recovery or set off against only a 
portion of the benefits. Based upon the unlimited nature of the statute, the 9th Circuit found that 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF PG. 10 
the Longshore and Harbor Worker's director could offset benefits against the entire settlement 
obtained by the Claimant in his third-party case. 
Again, this case provides little assistance to the Court herein. As noted above, the parties 
herein have both agreed that the statute granting subrogation rights to Respondents is limited and 
that distinguishes the Idaho statute at issue herein from the Federal Statute interpreted in Force. 
Furthermore, reference to the state court cases cited by Respondents, including the States 
of Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kansas and Tennessee, reveals that these cases, with rare 
exception, are all based upon statutory frameworks which are different from the framework here 
in Idaho. 
In Michigan, for instance, the grant of subrogation rights to the workers' compensation 
surety provides as follows: 
"In an action to enforce the liability of a third-party, the Plaintiff 
may recover any amount which the employee or his dependents or 
personal representative would be entitled to recover in an action in 
tort. Any recovery against the third-party for damages resulting 
from personal injuries or death only, after deducting expenses of 
recovery, shall first reimburse the employer or carrier for any 
amounts paid or payable under this act to date of recovery and the 
balance shall forthwith be paid to the employee or his dependents 
or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance 
payment by the employer on account of any future payments of 
compensation benefits." 
See, Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL § 418.827(5); MSA § 17.237(827)(5). 
Based upon this statute, the court found that the clear and unambiguous meaning of the 
statute required the Plaintiff to reimburse the worker's compensation surety from all of its 
settlement regardless of the manner in which it was characterized. Again, Appellant contends 
that this statutory grant of unlimited rights to a worker's compensation surety is different than 
the statute here in Idaho and that this case therefore provides little support for Respondents 
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argument. 
Respondents also cite to cases from Wisconsin and interestingly, the statutes which grant 
subrogation rights to a worker's compensation surety in Wisconsin are radically different from 
those in Idaho and are relatively unique. In Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 102, § 102.29, it appears 
that a complicated scheme has been enacted by the Wisconsin State Legislature allowing either 
the worker's compensation surety or the Claimant to bring a third-party case and a scheme of a 
division of the proceeds of these cases is provided which automatically allows an injured 
Claimant to obtain one third of any settlement regardless of how it is characterized. The party 
who brings a third-party case must give the other notice and allow participation so that third-
party cases in the State of Wisconsin and the findings of these cases bind the work comp surety if 
they are given notice. 
The statutory framework in Wisconsin, therefore, would allow a third-party recovery to 
be distributed partially to a Claimant in every case, and this alone distinguishes the Wisconsin 
situation from that herein. 
In the instant case, under the scenario proposed by Respondents, injured Claimants could 
be completely excluded from any recovery whatsoever from their third-party settlement with all 
the money going to either the Claimant's attorney or the work comp surety. Wisconsin has seen 
fit to prevent this outcome statutorily by including clear language in the statute. (Appended 
hereto for reference as Exhibit A). 
Respondents cite Dearing v. Perry, 499 N.E.2d 268 (1986), a convoluted Indiana case 
involving two lawsuits filed on behalf of the Claimant, one lawsuit filed on behalf of the 
worker's compensation surety, and negotiations which took place without the participation of the 
work comp surety. Upon settlement of the second suit filed by the Claimant, the trial court 
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ratified an allocation made by the Claimant and the third-party without participation of the work 
comp surety in an attempt to avoid the work comp surety's subrogated rights. 
In this situation, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that the allocation was invalid and that 
the statutory language involved Indiana Code 23-3-2-13 applied to "any recovery" obtained by 
the Claimants. 
The Appellants herein contend that the Indiana case presents little assistance in deciding 
the issue before this Court. Dearing, supra, is akin to the Struhs case, supra, in that the Claimant 
and the third-party attempted to negotiate and make an allocation of the negotiated settlement 
without the participation of the work comp surety. The court in Dearing had no sympathy for 
the Claimant or the manner in which the settlement was achieved. In addition, the Indiana 
Supreme Court noted that the statutory language granting subrogation rights to the work comp 
surety was without limitation except for attorney's fees and costs and found that the worker's 
compensation surety could obtain its subrogated interest from the entire settlement after 
attorney's fees and costs were deducted. 
In Beam v. Maryland Casualty Company, 477 S.W.2d 510 (Tenn. 1972), the court was 
once again concerned with a statutory framework which granted subrogation rights to a work 
comp surety without limitation. It appeared that the statute at issue, TCA 50-941 granted 
subrogation rights to the surety from the total amount of the "net recovery" without limitation. 
As indicated above, the parties hereto agree that the statute granting subrogation rights to 
Surety herein is limited and Appellant contends that this limitation applies both to the type of 
benefits paid and to the amount of benefits paid. 
The one case cited by Respondents which has a statute with language similar to Idaho is 
the case of McGranahan v. McGough, 820 P .2d 403 (Kan. 1991 ). In that case, it appeared that 
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the statute granting subrogation rights to the work comp sureties in Kansas was similar to that in 
Idaho, in that it allowed the employer subrogation rights to the extent of compensation and 
medical aid provided by the employer. See, K.S.A. 1990 Supp. § 44-504(b). 
In that case, the factual background revealed that the Claimant was sitting in his pickup 
truck on the side of the road when it was struck by another truck driven by a third-party. Both 
the Claimant and the third-party employee were on the job at the time. The Claimant was paid 
workman's compensation benefits for an injury to his right knee and later brought suit against 
the third-party and his employer. The trial court allowed the worker's compensation surety to 
intervene. 
Without participation of the work comp surety, Claimant and the third-party entered into 
a stipulation and confession of judgment which was presented to the trial court, which attributed 
and allocated damages for the Claimant's injury. This allocation included medical expense and 
pain and suffering but contained no allocation for lost wages despite the fact that the injured 
Claimant had been paid over $9000.00 in wages by the worker's compensation surety. 
Despite the objection of the work comp surety, the trial court found that the stipulated 
facts and judgment were fair and equitable and approved them. Thereafter the trial court allowed 
the work comp surety to recover $1000.00 in medical expenses less attorney's fees of one-third 
despite the fact that the worker's comp surety had paid over $3000.00 in medical expenses at that 
time. The trial court found that the settlement for pain and suffering for the Claimant and the 
damages for Claimant's wife were not subject to subrogation. 
The workers' compensation carrier appealed and in addressing the situation, the Kansas 
Supreme Court noted that under the statute, the worker's compensation carrier was only allowed 
to recover benefits if it had been required to pay like benefits out in the first place. 
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"The language of K.S.A.l990 Supp. 44-504(b) explicitly states the 
employer is allowed to subrogate to the extent the employer has 
paid compensation and medical aid. This indicates a recovery that 
is not compensable under worker's compensation is not subject to 
subrogation. Subrogation is not allowed because the award does 
not duplicate the compensation and medical aid provided by the 
employer. Subrogation is permitted to prevent double recovery by 
the employee. This interpretation is consistent with a 1990 court 
of appeals case Lemery v. Buffalo Airways, Inc., 14 Kan.App.2d 
301, 307-308, 789 P.2d 1176, rev. denied 246 Kan. 767 (1990); by 
adopting K.S.A.l989 Supp. 44-504, the legislature had attempted 
to achieve two things: (1) to preserve an injured worker's cause of 
action against third-party tortfeasors and (2) to prevent a double 
recovery by the employee from both the worker's compensation 
fund and a third-party tortfeasor." 
(See, McGranahan, 249 Kansas at 334). (Emphasis Added) 
As the Respondent has indicated, the Kansas Supreme Court went on to hold that because 
Kansas Workers' Compensation law does compensate an injured Claimant for pain and 
suffering, that recovery should have been allowed from the pain and suffering recovery made by 
the Claimant. 
In an attempt to make the favorable analysis of McGranahan relevant to the issue now 
before this Court, the Respondent has cited dicta from a case adjudicated more than seventy 
years ago as persuasive authority. Citing to the Supreme Court case of Close v. General Canst. 
Co., 61 Idaho 689, 106 P.2d 1007 (1940), Respondents audaciously allege that Idaho Worker's 
Compensation law is similar to the Kansas statutory scheme, in that both allow systems for the 
recovery of pain and suffering damages in a workers' compensation claim. A thorough 
examination, however, reveals that Close v. General Construction, and subsequent cases on the 
issue, does not support the proposition asserted by the Respondents. 
In Close, it appeared that a worker had suffered an injury when a tree fell on his leg 
breaking his right leg between the knee and the ankle. After the injured worker healed 
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sufficiently, he was assessed an impairment rating from the Idaho Code for a partial loss of his 
leg. After some period of time, Claimant's circulation in his right foot and leg deteriorated and 
unfortunately, it became necessary to amputate the Claimant's right leg about four inches below 
the knee. After a sufficient healing process, the Claimant was awarded an additional impairment 
rating drawn from the Idaho Code based upon the loss of his lower leg. The only question 
presented to the Supreme Court in that case was whether the previously paid impairment rating 
should be deducted from the impairment rating for the more serious condition. In other words, 
did the worker's compensation surety get credit for the first impairment as against the second 
impairment. 
In answering this question, the Supreme Court noted that they did not believe that the 
Legislature meant to allow a credit in this situation and mentioned in dicta that the Legislature 
must have intended in fixing the schedules of impairment in the Idaho Code to take into account 
loss of earning power, pain and suffering and physical and financial losses sustained as a result 
of the injury. 
Appellant would note that this decision does not aid the decision of the Court herein for 
several reasons. First, the statement from the Court cited above from 1940 is dicta and is not one 
of the holdings of the decision. Secondly, it is clear that the worker's compensation law 
definitions do not allow general damages as defined in Idaho law but only allow permanent 
partial impairment and permanent partial disability benefits as those terms are defined in the 
Worker's Compensation Act. See, Idaho Code§§ 72-424; 72-425; 72-427; 72-428; 72-430. 
Moreover, in examining the worker's compensation decisions that address damages for 
pain and suffering, it is clear that the Industrial Commission does not award impairment rating 
benefits based solely upon pain and suffering. See, Trapp v. Sage Volunteer Fire Department, 
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1994 IIC 1442 (1942). Indeed, as fonner Commissioner Kerns indicated some time ago in the 
case of Roger Davis v. Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc., 1997 IIC 0079 (1997), injured Claimant's 
have given up their common rights to general damages in enacting the Worker's Compensation 
statutes: 
"The primary goal of the Worker's Compensation Act is to relieve 
injured workers from adverse economic effects caused by disabling 
work-related injuries. The injured worker bargained his right to 
recover pain and suffering from the employer tortfeasor in 
exchange for sure and certain relief, i.e., his wages. When those 
benefits continue to be eroded and reduced there is at some point 
no longer the economic reliefbargained for by the injured workers. 
At that point, the legitimate state interest no long bears any rational 
relationship to the legislation. The essence of equal protection is 
fairness." 
See, Davis, supra. 
It should also be remembered that even if certain permanent partial impainnent ratings 
have some element of pain as a factor, general non-economic damages encompass much more 
than just pain and suffering. As defined by Idaho Jury Instruction 9.01, non-economic damages 
include the following elements: (I) the nature of the injuries; (2) the physical and mental pain 
and suffering, past and future; (3) the impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; ( 4) the 
disfigurement caused by the injuries. (See, IDJI 9.01). 
General or non-economic damages have been interpreted broadly in Idaho and include 
damages for general categories such as loss of enjoyment of life, see, Carlson v. Stanger, 146 
Idaho 642, 200 P.3d 1191 (Id. App. 2008); Loss of the ability to provide household services, see, 
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (Idaho 1986); Loss of ability to perform usual 
functions and enjoy hobbies, see, Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 
(1986); Anxiety over not being able to work, see, Moeller v. Harshbarger, 118 Idaho 92, 794 
P .2d 1148 (I d. App. 1990); loss of hobbies and recreational activities, see, Sanchez v. Galey, 115 
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Idaho 1064, 772 P.2d 702 (Idaho 1989); embarrassment, and many other categories. Indeed, 
case law has determined that there is no set standard for measuring the value of human health or 
happiness. See, Swanson v. U.S. by and through Veterans Administration, 557 F.Supp 1041 
(D.C. Idaho 1983). 
Appellant contends that none of these elements are covered by workers' compensation 
law and that to contend that general damages are included in the Idaho workers' compensation 
law is simply nonsense. Indeed, as Commissioner Kerns has indicated, these general damages 
were given up in exchange for the sure and certain relief afforded by the Worker's Compensation 
Act decades ago. 
It therefore appears that the McGranahan case, supra, appears to be the only case cited 
by Respondents which interprets language which is almost identical to that found here in Idaho. 
While both parties herein agree that the language of the Idaho statute does limit the rights ofthe 
Respondent as far as its subrogated interest is concerned, it appears that the Court in the 
McGranahan, supra, agrees completely. The holding in that case notes that the language of the 
statute is limiting and limits the Respondent to recover only those benefits for which a recovery 
is provided under the Worker's Compensation law. Because this Court is faced with language 
which is identical in Idaho Code § 72-223(3), Appellant contends that this holding is significant 
and carries substantial persuasive force. 
To summarize the cases from other states which have addressed this issue, it is clear that 
each states decision is based on the specific language of the statute that grants subrogation rights 
to the worker's compensation sureties in those respective jurisdictions. To make a sweeping 
generalization, as the Respondents have with regard to which line of authority is the majority or 
the minority, without reference to the statute upon which the decision is based is unconvincing. 
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Appellant herein contends that this case should be decided solely upon the language of 
the statute at issue in this case, and that it is clear that the statute applicable herein does indeed 
limit the subrogation rights of the Respondent Surety. The Respondent Surety has admitted that 
the statute contains limiting language and this limiting language is absent from many of the cases 
cited around the country by the Respondents. For these reasons, the Appellant would contend 
that this Court should pay specific and close attention to the statute upon which each state 
decision is made when deciding which states decisions have some persuasive effect. 
ALLOCATION OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES 
Because the Industrial Commission ruled that all of the Appellant's settlement was 
subject to the subrogation rights of the Respondent, they refused to make any allocation of the 
Appellant's third-party settlement to pain and suffering damages. 
If this Court agrees that the statute granting Respondent subrogated rights, Idaho Code § 
72-223(3) limits the Respondent's rights, then remand of this case to the Industrial Commission 
is necessary and appropriate so that the Industrial Commission can make additional factual 
findings with regard to how much of the Appellant's third-party settlement is comprised of pain 
and suffering damages which are exempt from Respondents subrogated rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to decide a question of first impression 
here in Idaho: Does a worker's compensation surety get to take all of the third-party recovery of 
an injured worker under Idaho Code § 72-223(3). 
Respondents would argue that they are entitled to a credit for all of the third-party 
recovery of any Claimant thereby depriving a Claimant of any recovery whatsoever for his third-
party rights. 
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Appellant contends that given the chance of the Respondents herein to participate in a 
hearing before the Industrial Commission, present evidence, and participate in the allocation of 
the Appellant's third-party recovery, that Appellant should be entitled to keep that part of his 
recovery designated as pain and suffering on the grounds and for the reasons that this is a 
recovery for which Workmen's Compensation law does not provide any benefit. 
The Respondents herein will admittedly never pay Appellant any recovery for pain and 
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life or any of the other elements of general damages allowed in 
Idaho. Yet, the Respondents contend that they are entitled to take this recovery from the 
Appellant even after they have had a chance to litigate the issue and be heard with regard to the 
proper allocation of the Appellant's third-party settlement. 
Based upon the legal authorities cited herein, Appellant contends that the framers of the 
Idaho Code could not have envisioned such a result and could not have intended that the 
Appellant herein be deprived of the entire benefit of his third-party recovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
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EXHIBIT A 
§ 102.29. Third party liability. 
Wisconsin Statutes 
Regulation of Industry 
Chapter 102. Worker's compensation 
Current through 2010 Legislative Session 
§ 102.29. Third party liability 
(1) The making of a claim for compensation against an employer or compensation insurer for the 
injury or death of an employee shall not affect the right of the employee, the employee's personal 
representative, or other person entitled to bring action, to make claim or maintain an action in tort 
against any other party for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd party; nor shall the 
making of a claim by any such person against a 3rd party for damages by reason of an injury to 
which ss. 102.03 to 102.64 are applicable, or the adjustment of any such claim, affect the right of 
the injured employee or the employee's dependents to recover compensation. The employer or 
compensation insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to pay a lawful claim under this chapter 
shall have the same right to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for 
such injury or death. If the department pays or is obligated to pay a claim under s. 102.81 (1 ), the 
department shall also have the right to maintain an action in tort against any other party for the 
employee's injury or death. However, each shall give to the other reasonable notice and 
opportunity to join in the making of such claim or the instituting of an action and to be represented 
by counsel. If a party entitled to notice cannot be found, the department shall become the agent of 
such party for the giving of a notice as required in this subsection and the notice, when given to 
the department, shall include an affidavit setting forth the facts, including the steps taken to locate 
such party. Each shall have an equal voice in the prosecution of said claim, and any disputes 
arising shall be passed upon by the court before whom the case is pending, and if no action is 
pending, then by a court of record or by the department. If notice is given as provided in this 
subsection, the liability of the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all parties having a right to 
make claim, and irrespective of whether or not all parties join in prosecuting such claim, the 
proceeds of such claim shall be divided as follows: After deducting the reasonable cost of 
collection, one-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured employee or the 
employee's personal representative or other person entitled to bring action. Out of the balance 
remaining, the employer, insurance carrier, or, if applicable, uninsured employers fund shall be 
reimbursed for all payments made by it, or which it may be obligated to make in the future, under 
this chapter, except that it shall not be reimbursed for any payments made or to be made under s. 
102.18(1) (bp), 102.22, 102.35(3), 102.57, or 102.60. Any balance remaining shall be paid to the 
employee or the employee's personal representative or other person entitled to bring action. If 
both the employee or the employee's personal representative or other person entitled to bring 
action, and the employer, compensation insurer, or department, join in the pressing of said claim 
and are represented by counsel, the attorney fees allowed as a part of the costs of collection shall 
be, unless otherwise agreed upon, divided between such attorneys as directed by the court or by 
the department. A settlement of any 3rd-party claim shall be void unless said settlement and the 
distribution of the proceeds thereof is approved by the court before whom the action is pending 
and if no action is pending, then by a court of record or by the department. 
(2) In the case of liability of the employer or insurer to make payment into the state treasury under 
s. 102.49 or 102.59 , if the injury or death was due to the actionable act, neglect or default of a 3rd 
party, the employer or insurer shall have a right of action against the 3rd party to recover the sum 
so paid into the state treasury, which right may be enforced either by joining in the action 
mentioned in sub. (1 ), or by independent action. Contributory negligence of the employee because 
of whose injury or death such payment was made shall bar recovery if such negligence was 
greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, and the recovery 
allowed the employer or insurer shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to such injured or deceased employee. Any action brought under this subsection may, 
upon order of the court, be consolidated and tried together with any action brought under sub. (1 ). 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an employee from taking the compensation that the 
employee may be entitled to under this chapter and also maintaining a civil action against any 
physician, chiropractor, psychologist, dentist, physician assistant, advanced practice nurse 
prescriber, or podiatrist for malpractice. 
(4) If the employer and the 3rd party are insured by the same insurer, or by the insurers who are 
under common control, the employer's insurer shall promptly notify the parties in interest and the 
department. If the employer has assumed the liability of the 3rd party, it shall give similar notice, in 
default of which any settlement with an injured employee or beneficiary is void. This subsection 
does not prevent the employer or compensation insurer from sharing in the proceeds of any 3rd-
party claim or action, as set forth in sub. (1 ). 
(5) An insurer subject to sub. (4) which fails to comply with the notice provision of that subsection 
and which fails to commence a 3rd-party action, within the 3 years allowed by s. 893.54, may not 
plead that s. 893.54 is a bar in any action commenced by the injured employee under this section 
against any such 3rd party subsequent to 3 years from the date of injury, but prior to 6 years from 
such date of injury. Any recovery in such an action is limited to the insured liability of the 3rd party. 
In any such action commenced by the injured employee subsequent to the 3-year period, the 
insurer of the employer shall forfeit all right to participate in such action as a complainant and to 
recover any payments made under this chapter. 
(6) 
(a) In this subsection, "temporary help agency" means a temporary help agency that is primarily 
engaged in the business of placing its employees with or leasing its employees to another 
employer as provided in s. 102.01 (2) (f). 
(b) No employee of a temporary help agency who makes a claim for compensation may make a 
claim or maintain an action in tort against any of the following: 
1. Any employer that compensates the temporary help agency for the employee's services. 
2. Any other temporary help agency that is compensated by that employer for another employee's 
services. 
3. Any employee of that compensating employer or of that other temporary help agency, unless 
the employee who makes a claim for compensation would have a right under s. 1 02.03(2) to bring 
an action against the employee of the compensating employer or the employee of the other 
temporary help agency if the employees were coemployees. 
(c) No employee of an employer that compensates a temporary help agency for another 
employee's services who makes a claim for compensation may make a claim or maintain an 
action in tort against any of the following: 
1. The temporary help agency. 
2. Any employee of the temporary help agency, unless the employee who makes a claim for 
compensation would have a right under s. 1 02.03(2) to bring an action against the employee of the 
temporary help agency if the employees were coemployees. 
(6m) 
(a) No leased employee, as defined ins. 102.315(1) (g), who makes a claim for compensation 
may make a claim or maintain an action in tort against any of the following: 
1. The client, as defined in s. 1 02.315(1) (b), that accepted the services of the leased employee. 
2. Any other employee leasing company, as defined in s. 1 02.315( 1) (f), that provides the services 
of another leased employee to the client. 
3. Any employee of the client or of that other employee leasing company, unless the leased 
employee who makes a claim for compensation would have a right under s. 1 02.03(2) to bring an 
action against the employee of the client or the leased employee of the other employee leasing 
company if the employees and leased employees were coemployees. 
(b) No employee of a client who makes a claim for compensation may make a claim or maintain 
an action in tort against any of the following: 
1. An employee leasing company that provides the services of a leased employee to the client. 
2. Any leased employee of the employee leasing company, unless the employee who makes a 
claim for compensation would have a right under s. 1 02.03(2) to bring an action against the leased 
employee if the employee and the leased employee were coemployees. 
(7) No employee who is loaned by his or her employer to another employer and who makes a 
claim for compensation under this chapter may make a claim or maintain an action in tort against 
the employer who accepted the loaned employee's services. 
(8) No student of a public school, as described ins. 115.01 (1 ), or a private school, as defined ins. 
115.001 (3r), who is named under s. 102.077 as an employee of the school district or private 
school for purposes of this chapter and who makes a claim for compensation under this chapter 
may make a claim or maintain an action in tort against the employer that provided the work 
training or work experience from which the claim arose. 
(8m) No participant in a community service job under s. 49.147(4) or a transitional placement 
under s. 49.147(5) who, under s. 49.147(4) (c) or (5) (c), is provided worker's compensation 
coverage by a Wisconsin works agency, as defined under s. 49.001 (9), and who makes a claim for 
compensation under this chapter may make a claim or maintain an action in tort against the 
employer who provided the community service job or transitional placement from which the claim 
arose. 
(8r) No participant in a food stamp employment and training program under s. 49.79(9) who, under 
s. 49.79(9) (a) 5., is provided worker's compensation coverage by the department of health 
services or by a Wisconsin Works agency, as defined in s. 49.001 (9), or other provider under 
contract with the department of health services or a county department under s. 46.215, 46.22, or 
46.23 or tribal governing body to administer the food stamp employment and training program and 
who makes a claim for compensation under this chapter may make a claim or maintain an action 
in tort against the employer who provided the employment and training from which the claim 
arose. 
(9) No participant in a work experience component of a job opportunities and basic skills program 
who, under s. 49.193(6) (a), 1997 stats., was considered to be an employee of the agency 
administering that program, or who, under s. 49.193(6} (a), 1997 stats., was provided worker's 
compensation coverage by the person administering the work experience component, and who 
makes a claim for compensation under this chapter may make a claim or maintain an action in tort 
against the employer who provided the work experience from which the claim arose. This 
subsection does not apply to injuries occurring after February 28, 1998. 
(1 0) A practitioner who, under s. 257.03, is considered an employee of the state for purposes of 
worker's compensation coverage while providing services on behalf of a health care facility, the 
department of health services, or a local health department during a state of emergency and who 
makes a claim for compensation under this chapter may not make a claim or maintain an action in 
tort against the health care facility, department, or local health department that accepted those 
services. 
(11) No security officer employed by the department of military affairs who is deputed under s. 
59.26(4m), who remains an employee of the state for purposes of worker's compensation 
coverage while conducting routine external security checks around military installations in this 
state, and who makes a claim for compensation under this chapter may make a claim or bring an 
action in tort against the county in which the security officer is conducting routine external security 
checks or against the sheriff or undersheriff who deputed the security officer. 
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